Talking about CBDCs with Izabella Kaminska and Ásgeir Bryjnar Torfason
Did Greenback Party members in the 1870s feel like I do when I hear the equivalent of hard money arguments then being used today to slow down inevitable financial progress?
For example, does the defense of the existing money hierarchy give a lot of power to private dealers to set arbitrary prices, backstopped by the Fed if they cause a panic?
If the Fed itself issues a CBDC, is the top of the money hierarchy voluntarily "doing violence" to itself? Since the Fed is public, why shouldn't it resolve strains on individual members of the public's balance sheets?
Does the money hierarchy do violence to the idea of financial independence for all?
When Mehrling at the end notes the need for a dealer to allow ledgers to trade with one another, is he conceding an almost monopolistic power to dealers to set prices arbitrarily?
Why is unlimited liquidity used to meet problems in the private payments system, but tightening is the preferred way to handle inflation (which could easily be treated as just another payments system problem solved by supplying Cost of Living Adjustments continuously if need be to end users of a CBDC)?
Will the limits ("quite unwieldy") assumed by current commenters one day be seen as unnecessarily restrictive as the assumptions of hard money defenders in the 1870s?